ANTITRUST

-

SHERMAN ACT

-

PARENT CORPORATION AND ITS

WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY INCAPABLE OF CONSPIRING IN VIOLATION OF SECTION ONE OF SHERMAN ACT Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S.Ct. 2731 (1984).

The broadly drafted language of section one of the Sherman
Act' has made that provision readily susceptible to judicial interpretation. 2 Aimed at promoting free competition, 3 the section
prohibits all contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that restrain interstate commerce. 4 An alleged violation of section one
must be based upon the conduct of two or more persons or entities.' The Act, however, provides no definition of what constitutes this requisite plurality of actors,6 and, therefore, courts
have been obliged to determine whether certain relationships in
the business world are subject to section one regulation.'
In the past, the United States Supreme Court has considered
whether the combined conduct of a parent corporation and its
subsidiaries violates section one of the Sherman Act 8-that is,
I Section one states in pertinent part:

"Every contract, combination in the

form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976).
2 The United States Supreme Court has refused to construe the Sherman Act
literally in analyzing a restraint of trade. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310

U.S. 469, 489 (1940); see also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)
(interpreting section 1 as invalidating only unreasonable restraints); Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (same); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (same).
3 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). Finding that the
Sherman Act was designed to preserve economic liberty, the Court in Northern Pacific
reasoned that such free competition would not only "yield the best allocation of
our economic resources" and result in lower prices, but would also play a crucial
role in safeguarding American democracy. Id.
4 15 U.S.C. § I.
5 See Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir.
1952) ("It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than a
private individual can ..
"),cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). See also infra notes
40-43 and accompanying text for a more detailed analysis of this concept.
6 See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 n.10 (1940) (drafters of
Sherman Act deliberately omitted "precise and all-inclusive definitions").
7 See infra text accompanying notes 41-47.
8 In a number of cases, the Supreme Court found that common ownership, in
and of itself, did not preclude a finding of conspiracy. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1950); United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947). But cf.United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422
U.S. 86, 113-14 (1975) (no conspiracy where there was "intimate and continuous
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whether such affiliated "actors" can be found to have participated in what has been referred to as an "intra-enterprise" or
"bathtub" conspiracy. 9 Until very recently, the Court had answered that question in the affirmative.'" In Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp.," however, the Court reversed its position
and held that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring in violation of section one. 12
From 1955 to 1968, Regal Tube Company (Regal) was a
wholly owned subsidiary of C.E. Robinson Company and was engaged in the manufacture of structural steel tubing used in heavy
equipment, cargo vehicles, and construction.' 3 Regal was
purchased in 1968 by Lear-Siegler, Inc. (Lear-Siegler), a California corporation, which then operated it as an unincorporated division. 4 Following the acquisition, David Grohne, who had been
vice president and general manager of Regal, became its
president. 15
In 1972, Copperweld Corporation (Copperweld), a Pennsylvania corporation that was also engaged in the production and
sale of structural steel tubing, 16 purchased the Regal division
from Lear-Siegler.1 7 Under the terms of the sales agreement,
Lear-Siegler and its subsidiaries were prohibited from competing
against Regal anywhere in the United States for a period of five
years.' 8 Copperweld then transferred all of Regal's assets to a
newly formed Pennsylvania corporation, which also bore the
cooperation and consultation" between commonly owned entities); Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29-30 (1962) (where
common ownership existed and affiliates acted as one entity, Court found no
conspiracy).
9 For thorough descriptions and analyses of this "intra-enterprise," or "bathtub," conspiracy doctrine, see Handler & Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate
Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REv. 23 (1981); Kempf, Jr., Bathtub Conspiracies:
Has Seagram Distilled a More Potent Brew?, 24 Bus. LAw. 173 (1968); Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using CorporateSubsidiaries, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20 (1968).
10 See, e.g.,
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 450 U.S. 211,
215 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1947); Cliff
Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1969).
11 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
12 Id. at 2745.
1' Id. at 2734.
14 Id.
15

Id.

Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 74 F.R.D. 462, 464 (N.D. Ill.
1977), aFd, 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982), revd, 104 S.Ct. 2731 (1984).
17 Copperweld, 104 S.Ct. at 2734.
16

18

Id.
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name Regal Tube Company.' 9 David Grohne, however, did not
remain with Regal as its president. Instead, he accepted a position with Lear-Siegler as its corporate secretary and served in
that capacity from February toJuly of 1972.20 During that period,
Grohne took active steps to establish his own steel tubing business 21 and in May 1972, he formed Independence Tube Corpo22
ration (Independence).
Independence began to solicit bids for a tubing mill supplier
and by late October 1972, it had secured an offer from Yoder
Company (Yoder). 23 Yoder, however, cancelled the purchase order upon receipt of a letter from Copperweld.2 4 In that letter,
Copperweld warned that it did not favor Independence's entry
into the structural tube market, and it promised to take all steps
necessary to protect its interests under the noncompetition
agreement. 25 Yoder's breach forced Independence to look elsewhere for a tube mill supplier. 2 6 Independence subsequently secured a contract with Abbey Etna Machine Company (Abbey),
which enabled it to begin operations in September 1974, nine
months later than it would have if Yoder had performed as re19 Id. Hence, Regal became a wholly owned incorporated subsidiary of Copperweld. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 313 (7th
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). Although Regal shared corporate headquarters with Copperweld in Pittsburgh, it continued manufacturing operations in
Chicago. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2734.
20 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2734. Grohne, however, continued working for LearSiegler through September of 1972 in order to finish certain projects. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
21 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2734. Grohne presented a financing proposal to the
Continental Illinois National Bank in Chicago in the spring of 1972 and also procured several dozen investors. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp.,
691 F.2d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
22 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2734.
23 Id. In December of 1972, Independence gave Yoder a purchase order stipulating delivery at the mill by the end of December 1973. Id.
24 Id.

25 Id. Copperweld's chairman and general manager believed that the noncompetition agreement with Lear-Siegler should preclude Grohne from engaging in such
conduct. Id. Copperweld's attorney, however, informed them that the agreement
was not binding on Grohne and advised them that their only possible legal recourse
was to seek an injunction against Grohne if they could prove that he had used any
of Regal's Irade secrets or technical information. Id. Copperweld's counsel then
drafted a letter containing this opinion, copies of which were forwarded by Copperweld to third parties, such as Yoder, with whom Grohne might have business
dealings. Id. Copperweld later alleged that it sent those letters only to prevent such
third parties from developing reliance interests in Grohne's activities. Id.
26 Id.

at 2735.
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quired under the earlier agreement. 2 7
Alleging that the conduct of Copperweld, Regal, and Yoder
had constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of
section one of the Sherman Act, Independence instituted an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. 2 8 Ajury concluded, inter alia, that Copperweld and Regal had violated section one, but that Yoder had not been involved in the violation. 29 As a result of the verdict, Independence
was awarded treble damages.3 0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed all of the trial court's findings. 3 ' In analyzing the claim
that Copperweld and Regal had conspired to restrain trade, the
court observed that because Yoder had been exonerated from
antitrust liability, the only parties remaining in the conspiracy
were a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary.3 2 Due
to the relationship between those defendants, the primary issue
in the case became whether such an "intra-enterprise conspiracy" constituted a violation of section one of the Sherman Act.3 3
27 Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 314 (7th Cir.
1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). Abbey had also received a letter from Copperweld. Id. See supra note 25 and accompanying text for discussion of the letters
sent by Copperweld.
28 Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 314-15 (7th
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). In the suit, Independence also asserted
the following: (1) that Copperweld and Regal had violated § 2 of the Sherman Act;
(2) that Yoder had breached its contract with Independence; (3) that Copperweld
and Regal had interfered with the contractual relationship between Independence
and Yoder; and (4) that Copperweld and Regal had libeled and slandered Independence to one of its potential customers. Id. The claim brought under § 2 of the
Sherman Act was dismissed before trial. Id. at 315.
29 Id. The jury also found that Yoder was liable for breach of the contract with
Independence, that Copperweld had interfered with Independence's contractual
relationship with Yoder, and that Regal had slandered Independence to a potential
customer. Id.
30 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2735. The legal basis for awarding treble damages in
antitrust suits is found at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981), which provides in part that
"any person . . . injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in anti-trust laws may sue therefore . . . without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
31 Independence Tube Co. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 331 (7th Cir.
1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
32 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2734.
33 Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 316 (7th Cir.
1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). The court used the term "intra-enterprise conspiracy" to refer to the relationship between a parent corporation and its subsidiary. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the development of that doctrine, see infra
notes 46-80 and accompanying text.
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The court of appeals reasoned that because a corporation and its
unincorporated division actually constituted a single entity, the
requisite plurality of actors was absent, and, accordingly, the two
were incapable of forming a conspiracy. 4 The appeals court explored whether that principle should be applied to a corporation
and its wholly owned subsidiary, because, "as a practical matter
there may be little difference between" the two forms of corporate affiliation. 5 Nevertheless, the court found a sufficient separation between Copperweld and its wholly owned subsidiary,
Regal, to justify a finding that a conspiracy had existed. 3 6 On petition by Copperweld and Regal, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether a parent corporation
and its wholly owned subsidiary were legally capable of conspiring in violation of section one of the Sherman Act.3 7 In reversing
the Seventh Circuit's decision, and holding that a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of so conspiring, the
Supreme Court disapproved of and overruled its prior inconsistent holdings.38
Prior to Copperweld, courts generally had found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether a conspiracy violative of
section one had existed unless they had first determined that the
defendants' agreement amounted to an "unreasonable" restraint
of trade.39 In those cases in which courts found that the defendants had unlawfully restrained trade, it became essential to examine the words "contract, combination, or conspiracy" in order
34 Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 316 (7th Cir.
1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 320. Relying on a previous Seventh Circuit holding that the existence of
an intra-enterprise conspiracy depended upon the "separateness" of the entities,
the court of appeals in Copperweld concluded that "Regal was not 'merely a service
arm of [its parent] [but was instead] more like a . . . separate corporate entity.' "
Id. (quoting Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 727 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980)).
37 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2734.
38 Id. at 2745.
39

See generally 2 E.

KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW

§ 9.1, at 4-5 (1980) (there

must be an initial finding that effect and object of business arrangement is to unlawfully restrain trade). The "reasonableness" standard arose out of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
In construing the words "in restraint of trade," Justice White, writing for the Standard Oil majority, stated that the common law "reasonableness" standard, or rule of
reason, was the appropriate standard for analyzing conduct under § 1. StandardOil,
221 U.S. at 58-60; see also United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106,
179-80 (1911) (reaffirming application of the "reasonableness" standard in antitrust suits). For a related discussion of the principle of per se unreasonableness, see
infra note 76.
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to ascertain whether the Sherman Act had been violated.40 Because the Act itself does not clearly specify when affiliated business associations are to be considered separate entities for
purposes of section one, determining whether affiliated entities
could conspire in violation of that provision became a longstanding and problematic issue among the courts. 4 ' Since it was
clear that the conduct of a single entity could not be found illegal,4 2 related corporate enterprises often raised the single entity,
or single trader, defense in response to accusations of section
one violations.43 Courts generally agreed that a corporation and
its unincorporated division could use that defense to avoid liability,4 4 although the United States Supreme Court never addressed
the issue.4 5 In contrast, where the affiliates were incorporated,
the Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, often found them
capable of conspiring in violation of section one.4 6 Predicting
40 See United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975) (to
"make out a Sherman Act violation," there first must be finding that defendants'
conduct restrained competition, and then, that they unlawfully conspired within
meaning of § 1).
41 See Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 26 (Supreme Court decisions involving
claims of intra-enterprise conspiracy were "aberrant" and their progeny produced
"confused and mischievous adjudications"); Kempf, supra note 9, at 181 (law surrounding intra-enterprise conspiracy labeled "fickle" as ajealous mistress); Willis &
Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 21 (application of intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine created "thorough-going uncertainty").
42 See, e.g., United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
43 See, e.g., Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1981); Knutson
v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 801-08 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
910 (1977); Brager & Co. v. Leumi Sec. Corp., 429 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), affd mem., 646 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2322 (1981).
44 See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970) (court reasoned
that single entity defense essential to preserve corporations' internal management
and administration); H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d
239, 245 (5th Cir. 1978) (corporation which merely adopts "organizational division
of labor" should not be penalized with treble damages); Poller v. CBS, 284 F.2d
599, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
45 The Supreme Court in Copperweld noted that it had never before addressed
the question of whether the Sherman Act could be violated by "coordinated conduct of a corporation and one of its unincorporated divisions." Copperweld, 104 S.
Ct. at 2742. That Court went on to find that such conduct must be construed as that
of a "single actor." Id.
46 See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. United States, 392 U.S. 134, 141-42
(1968); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951);
United States v. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. 218, 229 (1947). For decisions by Federal
circuit courts on this issue, see H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
577 F.2d 239, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1978); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders., Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1978).
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when a court would render a finding of such an "intra-enter47
prise" conspiracy, however, was often difficult.
In United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,4 s decided in 1947, the
Supreme Court first recognized that corporate affiliates were capable of engaging in an intra-enterprise conspiracy.4 9 In that
case, the defendant, a taxicab manufacturer, had acquired a controlling interest in a number of independent taxicab companies.5 0 The complaint alleged that because the manufacturer and
its affiliated cab companies had entered into an exclusive selling
arrangement, they had engaged in anticompetitive conduct,
which had an adverse effect on the interstate trade of taxicabs. 5 '
Confronted with the issue of whether the complaint stated a
claim under section one, the Yellow Cab Court began its analysis
by declaring that the "test of illegality under the [Sherman] Act is
the presence or absence of an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce. '5 2 The Court observed that if it could be proven
that the defendants' primary object in combining had been to re53
strain trade, then a clear violation of section one had occurred,
and the mere fact that the defendants had become affiliated could
not immunize them from antitrust sanctions.5 4 In dicta, the Court
expounded upon this proposition by declaring that the Sherman
Act was aimed at "substance, not form,"' 5 5 and, therefore, "[t]he
common ownership and control of the various corporate appellees are impotent to liberate the alleged combination and conspiracy from the impact of the Act." 5 6 Because the defendants
had been independently owned prior to the alleged wrongful
See generally Note, "Conspiring Entities" Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 95
L. REV. 661, 661-62 (1982) (rules for determining when entities were capable of section 1 conspiracy were "characterized by confused and arbitrary distinctions"); Comment, All in the Family: When Will Internal Discussion Be Labeled IntraEnterprise Conspiracy?, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 63, 64-65 (1975) (no "ultimate answers,"
only "patterns" appeared to exist).
47

HARV.

48

322 U.S. 218 (1947).

See Kempf, supra note 9, at 175.
Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 220-23. The manufacturer, however, did not wholly
own all of the subsidiaries. For example, he had acquired only 15% ownership of
one of the companies. Id. at 221.
51 Id. at 224-25.
52 Id. at 227.
53 Id. at 227-28.
54 Id. at 229.
55 Id. at 227 (citing Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 36061, 376-77 (1933)). But see Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2738 (also citing Appalachian
Coals, and declaring that "it is the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine itself that
'makes but an artificial distinction' at the expense of substance").
56 Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 227.
49

50
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conduct, it was apparently unnecessary for the Yellow Cab Court
to recognize an intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.5 7
Similarly, in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,58 a 1951
decision, the defendants-an American company and two foreign
firms-were unaffiliated prior to the unlawful combination,5 9
thus rendering any discussion of the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine superfluous. Nevertheless, the Timken Court relied upon
that doctrine in reaching its decision.60 In that case, the Federal
district court had found that the American corporation had acquired a partial interest in the two foreign companies solely for
anticompetitive purposes and that the affiliates had engaged in
price fixing and allocation of markets among themselves. 6 ' The
defendants contended that they had merely engaged in a "joint
venture" among themselves and therefore that they could not be
held to have violated the Sherman Act.6 2 Justice Black, writing
for the Timken majority, not only rejected that defense,6 3 but he
also demonstrated his adherence to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine by stating that merely because "there is common
ownership or control of the contracting corporations does not
liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws." '
Seventeen years later, in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp. ,65 the Court reaffirmed its adherence to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.6 6 In that case, the plaintiffs
57 Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 26 & n.16. In their article, which was written prior to the Copperweld decision, Handler and Smart note that in all of the
Supreme Court's section 1 decisions, liability could have been found without invoking an intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, with the exception of Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951), wherein the doctrine "may
have been necessary to the result reached." Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 268
n. 16; see also McQuade, Conspiracy, MulticorporateEnterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183, 195 (1955) (erroneous to say that decision in Yellow Cab
turned on intra-enterprise conspiracy, since enterprise was product of conspiracy).
58 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
59 Id. at 595. The district court in Timken noted that "[e]ach company was a
manufacturer and distributor, independent of the others, but joined for the sole
and only purpose of mutual benefits." United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.,
83 F. Supp. 284, 306 (N.D. Ohio 1949), affd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
60 See Timken, 341 U.S. at 594.
61 Id. at 595-96.
62 Id. at 597-98.
63 Id. at 598. In rejecting the defendants' contention the Court stated: "[O]ur
prior decisions plainly establish that agreements providing for an aggregation of
trade restraints such as those existing in this case are illegal under the Act." Id.
(citations omitted).
64 Id.
65 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
66 Id. at 141-42 (citing Timken and Yellow Cab).
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were franchised dealers of the defendants-a parent corporation
and its subsidiaries.67 The plaintiffs alleged that, since the defendants had refused to remove certain restrictive, anticompetitive provisions from their franchise agreement, and instead had
acted pursuant to those provisions, the defendants' conduct constituted an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade.6" The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit accepted the defendants' assertion that, because they composed a "single business entity," they could cooperate without violating the Sherman
Act.6 9 The Supreme Court rejected that defense, however, and
held that since the parent and its subsidiaries had "availed themselves of the privilege of doing business through separate corporations," common ownership was insufficient to free them from
the obligations that separate entities owed under the antitrust
laws.7" The Court noted, however, that each plaintiff could have
alleged the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants and
other franchise dealers that were not participating in the suit, or
even among itself and the defendants. 7' Therefore, as in Timken
and Yellow Cab, analysis by the Court of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine was unnecessary.
In contrast to the foregoing cases, in which the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine proved unnecessary to the Court's ultimate finding of liability, in the 1951 case of Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. ,72 there was no alternative basis

upon which the Court's decision could be premised.73 In that
case, the defendants were wholly owned and internally created
subsidiaries, which sold and distributed liquor that was manufacat 135.
68 Id. at 137. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that several of these anticompetitive provisions prevented them from purchasing from other suppliers, forced
them to sell other products manufactured by the defendants, and required them to
sell at fixed prices. Id. The plaintiffs maintained that, rather than complying with
their request to delete such anticompetitive terms, the defendants had not only
refused, but had threatened to terminate the agreements if the terms were not adhered to. Id.
69 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692, 694 (7th
Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
70 Perma Life Mufflers, 392 U.S. at 141-42 (citing Timken and Yellow Cab).
71 Id. at 142. Interestingly, the district court and the court of appeals held that,
because the plaintiffs had acquired the subject franchises with full knowledge of the
provisions in the agreement, they were barred from bringing the suit by virtue of
the in pan delicto doctrine. Id. at 137-38. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed,
reasoning that an in pari delicto defense was inappropriate to antitrust treble damage
actions. Id. at 138.
72 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
73 See Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 26 n.16.
67 Id.
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tured by their parent corporation."4 They were accused of violating section one of the Sherman Act, in that they conspired to sell
liquor only to those wholesalers who would resell it at prices
fixed by them.7 5 Inquiring first into the "reasonableness" of the
defendants' activity, the Kiefer-Stewart Court found that their
price-fixing scheme was illegal per se under the Act. 7 6 The Court
then evaluated the nature of the defendants' affiliation, as well as
their argument that they were "mere instrumentalities" of a single unit and therefore incapable of conspiring.77 Relying on its
earlier decision in Yellow Cab, the Supreme Court observed that
common ownership alone did not preclude a finding of conspiracy in violation of section one.7 8 Moreover, Justice Black, in his
majority opinion, declared that such antitrust regulation was especially applicable where, as in the case before him, the defendants "held themselves out as competitors. 7 9
Although the Supreme Court clearly established the existence of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, it failed to explain in its subsequent opinions when the doctrine was properly
applicable. 80 Rather, the Court made only broad statements indicative of the principle that common ownership did not create
immunity against antitrust sanctions. 8 ' As a result, some circuits
concluded that, as a general rule, so long as there were separate,
incorporated entities, the requisite plurality of actors was pres74 Keifer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 212. For a more detailed description of the relationship between the affiliates, see Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 182 F.2d 228, 229 (7th Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
75 Keifer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 212-13.
76 See id. at 213. Justice Black, writing for the majority, reasoned that such an
arrangement "cripple[d] the freedom of traders and thereby restrain[ed] their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment." Id. at 213.
The principle of per se unreasonableness arose out of the widespread belief
among many courts that "some business practices, because of their severe anticompetitive impact and lack of countervailing economic benefit, should be conclusively
presumed to result in an undue or unreasonable restraint of trade." 2 E. KINTNER,
supra note 39, § 8.3, at 362-63. The Supreme Court first expressly adopted this per
se doctrine in 1927 in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 237 U.S. 392, 397
(1927), wherein the Court indicated that because the aim and result of every pricefixing agreement is to eliminate competition, such agreements must necessarily be
found unlawful. 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 39, § 8.3, at 365-66. Thus, the KeiferStewart Court's articulation that the subject price-fixing scheme was per se illegal
clearly conformed to the precedent established in Trenton Potteries.
77 Keifer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 215.
78 Id. (citing Yellow Cab).
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, 392 U.S. 134; Timken, 341 U.S. 593; Keifer-Stewart,
340 U.S. 211; Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. 218.
81 See generally Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 38-39.
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ent, even if those entities constituted a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary.8 2 Other courts, however, followed the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Win3

ckler & Smith Citrus Products Co.

8

In Sunkist, which was decided in 1962, the conduct at issue
was that of an agricultural cooperative, its wholly owned subsidiaries, and an affiliated cooperative.8 4 An action was brought
against those parties based upon their alleged conspiracy to restrain and monopolize trade in violation of sections one and two
of the Sherman Act. 5 In assessing the nature of the defendants'
relationship, the Sunkist Court was influenced by section six of
the Clayton Act, which, under certain circumstances, immunizes
agricultural organizations from antitrust liability;8 6 and by the
Capper-Volstead Act's detailed enumerations of the activities
permitted by such organizations.8 7 The Court concluded that
those provisions supported the defendants' contention that they
should be treated as a single entity, and therefore were incapable
of conspiring in violation of section one.8 8 Using the "substance
over form" principle that it had adopted in Yellow Cab, the Court
in Sunkist reasoned that to inflict liability merely because the defendants were separately incorporated "would be to impose
grave legal consequences upon organizational distinctions that
82
83
84

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

370 U.S. 19 (1962).
Id. at 20.

85 Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that, as a result of the defendants' control of the orange supply in the California-Arizona market, not only had trade been
restrained but also, in effect, the plaintiffs had been eliminated as competitors in
the sale of fruit juices. Id. at 22-23.
86 Id. at 27-30. Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides in part:
'Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence . . .of . . .agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help . . . nor shall such organizations,

or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations
or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws.'
Id. at 27 n.7 (quoting § 6 of the Clayton Act, which is currently codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (1982)).
87 Id. at 27-30. The Capper-Volstead Act provides in part that " 'persons engaged in the production of agricultural products . . .may act together in associations, corporate, or otherwise . . . in collectively processing, preparing for market,
handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce, such products of persons so engaged.' " Id. at 28 (quoting portion of Capper-Volstead Act that is currently codified at 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1982)).
88 Sunkist, 370 U.S. at 29-30. The Court declared that "the 12,000 growers here
involved are in practical effect and in the contemplation of the statutes one 'organization' or 'association' even though they have formally organized themselves into
three separate legal entities." Id. at 29.
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are of de minimis meaning and effect." 89
The Supreme Court's decision in Sunkist subsequently induced several circuit courts to consider the facts and circumstances of each particular case before reaching a decision with
respect to the conspiratorial capacity of affiliated entities. 90 For
example, in Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp. ,91 the Seventh Circuit
followed such an approach. In that case, a parent corporation
and its wholly owned subsidiary were allegedly engaged in an unlawful combination and were attempting to force independent
dealers out of business.9 2
The Photovest court first examined the defendants' conduct
and found that it constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade
in violation of section one of the Sherman Act.9" The court then
focused upon the nature of the relationship between the parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary in order to determine whether they were sufficiently independent to be capable of
conspiring.9 4 Like the Supreme Court in Sunkist, the Photovest
court considered more than merely the defendants' affiliation; it
also took into account "the extent of integration of ownership,
whether the two corporations had separate managerial staffs...
and the extent to which they may, acting as one, wield market
power which they would not possess if viewed as separate
firms." 9 5 Based upon that analysis, the Photovest court determined
that the defendants were not sufficiently distinct to constitute
conspirators within the contemplation of section one, and thus it
concluded that an "intra-enterprise" conspiracy had not
96
existed.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Copperweld, courts
followed either one of two approaches in determining whether
affiliated entities were capable of conspiring. One approach was
to reach a finding solely on the basis of the fact that the affiliated
parties were separately incorporated, as the Supreme Court apparently did in Yellow Cab, Timken, Perma Life Mufflers, and KieferStewart.9 7 The other approach was to invoke the "substance over
89 Id.
90 See Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 35 n.62.

91 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
92 Id. at 707.
93 Id. at 726.
94 Id.
95 Id. (quoting L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 328 (1977)).
96 Id. at 727.
97 See supra notes 48-80 and accompanying text.
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form" principle and to consider the particular facts of each case,
a method of analysis employed by the Supreme Court in Sunkist
and by the Seventh Circuit in Photovest.98
In a marked deviation from both approaches, the Copperweld
Court established a per se 99 rule for use in analyzing the conspiratorial capacities of a parent corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary.' 0 Declining to assess either the reasonableness of the
conduct at issue or the nature of the defendants' relationship, the
Copperweld Court held that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are to be treated as a single entity, incapable of conspiring in
violation of section one of the Sherman Act.' 0 ' Consequently, the
intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine is now inapposite to that
0 2
relationship. 1

In Copperweld, the Court first declared that its object was to
resolve the issue of whether the coordinated activities of a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary constitute conduct
that falls within the purview of section one of the Sherman Act, in
order to determine whether the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine is applicable in such a situation. 10 The Court recognized
that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine had been expressly
approved in a number of its prior decisions, but it noted that because the doctrine's application had been unnecessary in all but
one of those cases, the "merits" of the doctrine had never been
examined in depth. 0 4
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, began his
analysis by observing that section one of the Act is aimed only at
concerted activity and does not govern "wholly unilateral" conduct, which is regulated instead by section two of the Act. 10 5 He
98 See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
99 Per se as used herein should not be confused with the antitrust principle of per
se unreasonableness, see supra note 76, but is instead borrowed from Justice Stevens's choice of words. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2746 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2746 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10

Id. at 2745.

See id. ChiefJustice Burger, writing for the Copperweld majority, observed that
in situations involving a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, "antitrust remedies may be policed adequately without resort to an intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine." Id.
103 Id. at 2736.
104 Id. See also supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Kiefer-Stewart, the one case where the doctrine's application was necessary.
105 Copperweld. 104 S. Ct. at 2740. Section two of the Sherman Act provides in
part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
102

956

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:943

noted that, because concerted activity "deprives the marketplace
of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competition
assumes and demands," concerted behavior is to be scrutinized
more rigorously than unilateral conduct.' ° 6 In analyzing the two
sections of the Act, Chief Justice Burger stated that a "gap" exists between them,'0 7 which immunizes an entity whose anticompetitive, "unilateral" conduct satisfies neither the concerted
activity requirement of section one nor the "monopolization" requirement of section two. 10 8 Hence, the Court deduced that the
threshold inquiry is to determine whether the allegedly wrongful
conduct falls within that gap and thereby exempts the entity from
antitrust liability.'0 9 Chief Justice Burger further observed that
where, as in the case before him, a section one violation is alleged, the Court must ascertain whether the conduct constitutes
"concerted activity" within the meaning of that provision.110
Reiterating that section one does not apply to "wholly unilateral" activity, the ChiefJustice expressed agreement with a series of decisions in which the requisite plurality of actors was
found to have been absent in instances involving activity between
guilty of a felony." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The Copperweld Court observed that "Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in contrast, reaches unreasonable restraints of trade
effected by a 'contract, combination. . . or conspiracy' between separate entities. It
does not reach conduct that is 'wholly unilateral.' " Copperweld, 104 S.Ct. at 2740
(emphasis in original) (citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)).
106 Copperweld, 104 S.Ct. at 2740-41. The majority noted, however, that the rigorous scrutiny applied to concerted behavior is more limited where the conduct is
found to be illegal per se, such as horizontal price fixing and market allocation. Id. at
2740. The Copperweld Court declared that the degree of scrutiny applied to other
concerted behavior such as mergers, joint ventures, and vertical agreements was to
be governed by the rule of reason, under which the actual effect of such conduct
would be assessed. Id. at 2740-41.
107 Id. at 2744. Chief Justice Burger decided that such a gap was intentionally
created by Congress. Id. He observed that Congress had "sound" reasons for immunizing from antitrust liability the conduct of a single entity, since the underlying
objective of the Sherman Act was to promote competition. Id. Moreover, the Copperweld Court noted that Congress would not have included language such as "contract, combination, or conspiracy" if it had intended that section one of the
Sherman Act apply to "unilateral conduct," especially since the entirety of section
two would thereby be rendered "superfluous." Id.
108 Id. See supra note 105 for a recitation of the monopolization requirement of
section two of the Sherman Act.
109 Copperweld, 104 S.Ct. at 2744-45.
1 10 Id. at 2740-42, 2745. Pursuant to determining whether the alleged wrongful
conduct constituted "concerted activity," Chief Justice Burger focused upon not
only the terms "contract, combination . . .or conspiracy" of section one but also
that section's underlying purpose of promoting effective competition. Id. at 274 142.
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officers or employees of the same firm,"' as well as instances of
activity between a parent corporation and its unincorporated division."12 He reasoned that in both situations the combined or
coordinated activity did not constitute the amalgamation of separate sources of economic power, but merely entailed consolidation of the actors' common interests." 3 The Court further
observed that coordination within a business enterprise, whether
among employees or among the parent and its unincorporated
divisions, was likely to make that firm more competitive, ultimately to the benefit of the public." 4
Having determined that the activity of entities that are committed to commonly shared interests does not constitute "concerted activity" within the meaning of section one of the
Sherman Act, the Copperweld Court concluded that the same rationale should apply to the conduct of a parent corporation and
its wholly owned subsidiary." 5 Chief Justice Burger reasoned
that a parent and its subsidiary, like a corporation and its divisions, share common objectives and, thus, "their general corporate actions are guided or determined not by two separate
corporate consciousnesses, but one."" ' 6 He added that a parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary "always have a 'unity of purpose
or a common design,' " regardless of the degree of separateness
or amount of control the parent exercises," 7 and thus, they al'''

Id. at 2741 n.15.

Id. at 2742 n.16.
Id. at 2741. Assessing the nature of the relationship between a company and
its officers or employees, the Court concluded that "[t]he officers of a single firm
are not separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests, so agreements among them do not suddenly bring together economic power that was previously pursuing divergent goals." Id. The Court similarly noted that a parent
corporation and its unincorporated division share common economic interests. Id.
at 2742. Although the Court in Copperweld admitted that it had not yet directly
decided upon the antitrust implications of that relationship, it stated that there
could be "little doubt that the operations of a corporate enterprise organized into
divisions must be judged as the conduct of a single actor." Id. at 2742.
114 Id. Chief Justice Burger explained that punishing companies for delegating
power to its subunits would "deprive consumers of the efficiencies decentralized
management may bring." Id.; see also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 1,421 U.S. 616, 623 (1975) ("competition based on efficiency
is a positive value that the antitrust laws strive to protect").
115 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2742.
116 Id. In describing the relationship between a parent corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary, the Court stated that it was "not unlike a multiple team of horses
drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver." Id.
117 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781 (1946)). The Court observed that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary "share a common purpose whether or not the parent keeps a tight rein over
112
113
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ways compose a "single entity" and are incapable of conspiring
in violation of section one.' 1 8
The Copperweld Court further observed that there is no justifiable basis for finding the existence of conspiratorial conduct in
the relationship between a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary when courts generally have agreed that a parent and its unincorporated division cannot engage in such conduct.1 1 9 Chief
Justice Burger explained that, because a corporation is free to
organize a subunit either as an unincorporated division or as a
wholly owned subsidiary, it should not be penalized for choosing
the type of structure that is best suited to its business purposes.12 0 He reasoned that if antitrust liability were founded
upon the "garb in which a corporate subunit [is] clothed," corporations would be induced to structure their subunits as unincorporated divisions, rather than as wholly owned subsidiaries and
thus "deprive[] consumers and producers of the benefits that the
subsidiary form may yield."' 2'1 The Court therefore concluded
that antitrust liability should not depend on the manner in which
a subsidiary is structured. 122 To illustrate that point, ChiefJustice
Burger considered the case at bar, wherein the nature of the activity in which Regal engaged as a wholly owned subsidiary of
Copperweld was no different, competitively or otherwise, from
its previous activity as an unincorporated division of Lear23
Siegler. 1
Having determined that the conduct of a parent corporation
and its wholly owned subsidiary does not constitute concerted
activity within the meaning of section one of the Sherman Act, on
the subsidiary; the parent may assert full control at any moment if the subsidiary
fails to act in the parent's best interests." Id. (footnote omitted).
118 Id. at 2742 n. 18. Prior to this decision, business entities had invoked a "single
entity" defense. See supra notes 42 & 43 and accompanying text.
119 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2741-43.
120 Id. at 2743. Noting that an entity often incorporates its subdivision for valid
management and business purposes, ChiefJustice Burger pointed out that special
tax problems are avoided as a result of such separate incorporation. Id. at 2743 &
n.20.
121 Id. at 2743. The Court observed that there was "nothing inherently anticompetitive about a corporation's decision to create a subsidiary," and, in fact, such
separate incorporation served "efficiency of control" and "economy of operations." Id.
122 Id. at 2744.
123 Id. at 2743-44. The Court observed that the only distinction between either
arrangement was the company from which Regal's economic power was derived;
first from Lear-Siegler while it was an unincorporated division, and then from Copperweld, as its wholly owned subsidiary. Id. at 2744.
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the bases of both the underlying policies of the Act' 2 4 and the
nature of the entities' relationship, 12 5 the Court referred again to
the "'gap' in the Act's proscription against unreasonable restraints of trade."' 2 6 Chief Justice Burger stated that the concerted behavior of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary,
which does not amount to a monopoly within the meaning of section two, falls within that gap. 127 The Court therefore concluded
that application of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine is ef28
fectively precluded in the context of such a relationship.
Referring to its previous decisions in which the doctrine had
been applied to the parent-subsidiary relationship, the Coppenveld
Court emphasized the fact that liability could have been premised
in those cases without resort to the doctrine. 2 9 Observing that
''not a single holding of antitrust liability by [the] Court would
today be different in the absence of an intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine," the Court expressly disapproved and overruled all
of its "prior, inconsistent holdings." 130
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion,'
declared that the
majority mistakenly had disregarded the important principles
124 See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the underlying policies of the Act.
125 See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nature
of the entities' relationship.
126 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2744. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this "gap."
127 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2745. ChiefJustice Burger declared that "[u]nless we
second-guess the judgment of Congress to limit § 1 to concerted conduct, we can
only conclude that the coordinated behavior of a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary falls outside the reach of that provision." Id.
128 Id. The Court added that antitrust remedies, other than the intra-enterprise
doctrine, could be applied to the anticompetitive conduct of a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary. Id. Such remedies include application of section one of the Sherman Act and section seven of the Clayton Act to the "initial" combination by an
entity, as well as application of section two of the Sherman Act and section five of
the Federal Trade Commission Act to any subsequent conduct by the entity. Id.
See infra notes 147-54 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of
these remedies.
129 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2736-39. The Court cited Yellow Cab and Timken for
the proposition that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine "does not pertain to
corporations whose initial affiliation was itself unlawful." Id. at 2738. The Copperweld majority also noted that, since a conspiracy could have been charged between the defendants and independent parties in Perma Life Mufflers, application of
the doctrine in that case was unnecessary. Id. at 2739. Similarly, ChiefJustice Burger observed that, in Kiefer-Stewart, the same result could have been reached "on
the ground that the subsidiaries conspired with wholesalers other than the plaintiffs." Id. at 2738 (footnote omitted).
130 Id. at 2745.
131 Justices Brennan and Marshall joined inJustice Stevens's dissent.
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that underlay the Supreme Court's holdings on "at least seven
previous occasions."'' 32 The dissent maintained that the majority's decision to overrule those cases was not justified. 33 Justice
Stevens claimed that the earlier cases had focused on the true
issue-the relative market power held by the concerned entities. ' 34 Advocating an approach that would focus upon the reasonableness of the restraint, Justice Stevens reasoned that the
intra-enterprise doctrine addresses the "gap" that exists between
section one and section two of the Sherman Act and permits imposition of section one liability when the market power held by
35
the entities restrains marketwide competition.
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's assertion that integration between affiliates often is desirable, but he could not justify protecting such integration when the effect would be to
promote anticompetitive conduct. 36 Moreover, he explained
that his view was supported both by common law doctrines 137
and by the legislative history of the Act.' 38 The evidence, he ob132 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2748 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The decisions he referred to were Perma Life Mufflers; Timken; Kiefer-Stewart; Schine Chain Theatres, Inc.
v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100
(1948); Yellow Cab; and United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173
(1944). See Copperweld, 104 S.Ct. at 2746-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133 Copperweld, 104 S.Ct. at 2748-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Quoting from Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305 (1984), Justice Stevens recognized that "any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification." Copperweld,
104 S. Ct. at 2746 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Copperweld, 104 S.Ct. at 2752 & n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'35 Id. at 2752-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Stevens noted
that the intra-enterprise doctrine could be applied to affiliated conspirators who
attempt to harm a third party who refuses to join them and to situations in which
affiliated businesses controlled by organized crime threaten monopolization
through "violence or intimidation of competitors." Id. at 2753 & nn.23-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 2751-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed that the
"problem with the Court's new rule is that it leaves a significant gap in the enforcement of § 1 with respect to anticompetitive conduct that is entirely unrelated to the
efficiencies associated with integration." Id. at 2752 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 2750 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that at common law, a
corporation always has been recognized as a separate legal entity and that Congress
had indicated its acquaintance with that common law rule. Id. (citing 21 CONG. REC.
2571 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Teller)).
138 Id. at 2750-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens maintained that the
Court had "long recognized" that Congress intended section one to have a "broad
sweep." Id. at 2749 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He drew special attention to the fact
that when the Act was drafted, Congress had been particularly concerned with the
anticompetitive conduct of what it termed "trusts," that is, a combination consisting of affiliated corporations. Id. at 2750 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see id. at 2744
n.23 (language relied upon by dissent "refer[s] to combinations created for the
very purpose of restraining trade"; "post-acquisition conduct" of such entities, the

NOTES

19851

961

served, indicated that the defendants' conduct had "precious little to do with effective integration between parent and subsidiary
corporations."' 39 In effect, he decided that the defendants' conduct was "manifestly anticompetitive" and should not have been
"immunized from scrutiny under [section one] of the Sherman
Act."' 4 ° The dissent criticized the majority for its failure to explain why the mere fact of the defendants' affiliation should immunize conduct that produces a marketwide restraint on
competition.141 Justice Stevens, in conclusion, reasoned that aper
se rule of antitrust immunity that ignores the competitive impact
of the conduct at 42issue is just as undesirable as a per se rule of
antitrust liability.

In the dissent's view a court should examine the defendant's
conduct and determine whether it constitutes an unreasonable
restraint of trade before assessing the nature of the relationship
involved. 143 By contrast, under the analysis adopted by the majority, an initial inquiry is made into the relationship of the parties-that is, whether the defendants accused of conspiring in
violation of section one are a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary. 14 4 While in past cases that consideration was secondary in
determining whether section one had been violated, under Copperweld that relationship alone can preclude liability under section
one, regardless of the competitive impact of the defendants'
5
conduct.

1

Subsequent to Copperweld, in cases in which the defendants'
relationship is that of parent and wholly owned subsidiary, a section one claim against them cannot be sustained." 46 Conse-

quently, a complainant who wishes to bring an antitrust suit
against a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary
must now predicate its claim on some other provision of the antitype of conduct present in Copperweld, not addressed by Congress and impliedly
lawful).
139 Id. at 2746 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140 Id. The dissent reasoned that the effect of the conduct by Copperweld and
Regal "was to exclude a potential competitor of [Regal] from the market" through
economic coercion of potential suppliers and customers. Id.
141 Id. at 2755 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 2746 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed that "the Court
would be better advised to continue to rely on the Rule of Reason." Id.
144 See id. at 2740-45.
145 See id. at 2755 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (noting that Copperneld majority's holding was a per se rule, unaffected by considerations of economic impact of conduct at
issue).
146 See id. at 2745.
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trust laws. For example, section two of the Sherman Act may be
applied if the defendants' activities constitute monopolization or
an attempt to monopolize. 4 7 If the conduct at issue, however, is
"unilateral" in nature and does not "threaten monopolization,"
thereby falling within the "gap" between sections one and
two, 14 8 a complainant must ground its assertion of liability on
other antitrust laws. Section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 149 for example, may furnish the appropriate ground for
relief. That provision grants the Federal Trade Commissioner
authority to declare the conduct of "persons, partnerships, or
corporations" unlawful if it constitutes use of an "unfair method
of competition" and "deceptive acts affecting commerce." 150 In
addition, activity characterized by acquisitions of stock or assets
in another company may fall within the purview of section seven
of the Clayton Act. 15 ' That section prohibits one entity from acquiring the stock or assets of another entity or entities engaged
in commerce where the effect of the transaction "may be to substantially lessen competition" or to "create a monopoly."1 5 2 Fi147
148

Id. See supra note 105 for the relevant text of section two.
See supra notes 107 & 108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the

"gap."

149 Section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides, in part, that:

(a)(l) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful.
(2) The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations. . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
150 See id.
151 Section seven of the Clayton Act provides in part that:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock . . .or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where . . . the effect of

such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly.
Id. § 18. Interestingly, use of the word "may" has been held to establish a lower
standard of proof, requiring only a "probability of anti-competitive effects." See
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962). Hence, the scope
of this section may be much broader than other antitrust regulations of stock or
asset acquisitions, including sections one and two of the Sherman Act. But see
United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975) (defendant's acquisition of outstanding shares of system of branch banks in which it owned 5% interest
and with which it engaged in continuous cooperation and consultation upheld
under both § 1 of Sherman Act and § 7 of Clayton Act because anticompetitive
effects of defendant's conduct were not probable but only ephemeral possibilities).
152 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
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nally, if the combination of entities is motivated by and is the
product of an anticompetitive purpose, section one
of the Sher15 3
remedy.
antitrust
an
as
available
still
is
man Act
Because of the limited scope of these remedies, 1 54 however,
there is no real assurance that, absent application of section one
of the Sherman Act, the conduct of a parent corporation and its
wholly owned subsidiary can be reached through alternative antitrust provisions. Considering this fact, the Copperweld Court's justification for eliminating the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine1 55 is less convincing. Nonetheless, the Court's decision
was not unexpected, in light of the widespread criticism of the
doctrine and the manner in which it had been applied. 5 6 One
criticism, which was widely expressed by commentators, was that
the doctrine produced much uncertainty in the business community which, it was feared, not only would hinder disposition of
claims, 15 7 but might also encourage "nuisance suits" by parties
tempted by the possibility of a treble damage award.' 5 8
In addition, because courts generally found unincorporated
1 59
divisions and their parent companies incapable of conspiring,
the doctrine was viewed as a deterrent to decentralized corporate
See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2745.
For example, section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act does not apply to banks, certain described savings and loan institutions, certain common carriers and air carriers, or certain persons, partnerships, and corporations subject to
the Packers and Stockyards Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1982). In addition, section
seven of the Clayton Act is limited to stock or asset acquisitions. See id. § 18. Furthermore, section two of the Sherman Act is aimed at monopolization and attempts
to monopolize. See id. § 2 (1982). Finally, section one of the Sherman Act may be
applied to affiliated entities only where their initial combination was in restraint of
trade. See id. § 1.
155 See supra note 128 and accompanying text for a discussion of this justification.
156 See, e.g., Stengel, Intra-EnterpriseConspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35
Miss. L.J. 5, 27 (1963) ("It is submitted that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine -which has also been called 'corporate self-abuse' and 'bath tub conspiracy'-should be rejected in its entirety.") (footnotes omitted); Note, supra note 47,
at 681 ("These [antitrust] goals would be best served by a Court ruling that related
corporations are legally incapable of conspiring among themselves in violation of
section 1.").
157 See McQuade, supra note 57, at 211 (uncertainty produced by doctrine hampers business, without providing assurance of offsetting advantage to the community); see also Comment, supra note 47, at 87 (without any authoritative ruling by
Supreme Court setting forth proper scope of intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine,
defense attorneys will be forced to muster enough decisional law and sound policy
arguments to avoid broad application of § 1).
158 See Note, supra note 47, at 672 (increase in "nuisance" suits caused by application of intra-enterprise doctrine would, in effect, "discourage potential defendants
from competing aggressively").
159 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
153
154
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structuring.' 6 ° Discouraging decentralization, however, does not
necessarily further antitrust objectives, because, in most instances, an entity's decision to decentralize has nothing to do
with market power considerations. 161 Corporations often incor1 62
to comporate their divisions in order to acquire tax benefits,
163
to better evaluate a specific business
ply with foreign laws,
operation, and even to establish a certain psychological effect
among employees, who are given titles in the substructure. 1 64 In
sum, because legitimate business objectives are often hampered
by the adverse effects of the doctrine's application, it follows that
the doctrine did not necessarily further the antitrust goal of efficiency in the competitive market.' 6 5
Despite the undesirable effects of utilizing the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, the question remains whether the Copperweld Court's response, in the form of a per se rule, is more
advantageous. The unpredictable manner in which the doctrine
has been applied previously is not unlike the uncertain and undefinable scope of the Copperweld decision. Because Copperweld
addresses only the conduct of a parent corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary, it is not clear whether the decision can or will
be extended to encompass other business relationships. The
Court's dicta indicates that a parent and its unincorporated division are incapable of conspiring, 166 yet the majority failed to address the conspiratorial capacity of partially owned subsidiaries
or that of wholly owned entities sharing common ownership.
Although ChiefJustice Burger distinguished Copperweld from several cases involving such relationships, 1 6 7 the Court nevertheless
agreed with the holdings, 68 explaining that application of the in160 See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 26 (because doctrine discouraged company from "decentralizing" or incorporating its divisions, requirement of "plurality" under § 1 relegated to mere "technicality").
161 See Kempf, supra note 9, at 178 (whether or not to decentralize is "organizational" decision which often promotes competition); Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 9,
at 26-27 (corporate subsidiaries usually established for reasons totally distinct from
market considerations).
162 See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 27 (tax advantages include multiple surtax exemptions only available to separate corporations, reduction in exposure to
unreasonable tax accumulations, and expedition of more suitable accounting periods and tax credit elections).
163 See id. at 28 & n.24.
164 See id. at 28 & n.25.
165 See Note, supra note 47, at 681 (doctrine "inconsistent with the goals of promoting competition and economic efficiency").
166 See supra notes 112 & 113 and accompanying text.
167 See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2736-39.
168 Id. at 2745.
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doctrine was not necessary to the retra-enterprise conspiracy
16 9
sults reached therein.
Perhaps the only means of predicting the future application
of the Copperweld rule is to consider the Court's emphasis on its
theory that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary
share common objectives and interests, regardless of the degree
of control exercised by the parent company.' 7 ° That theory
would apply logically to wholly owned subsidiaries, commonly
owned by a corporate parent, because the entire "family" of entities would share the same objectives.' 7 ' It is also arguable that
when a parent corporation owns a majority interest 1 72 in a subcommon goals and act with one
sidiary, the two entities share
"corporate consciousness"'' 73 and, thus, they should be immune
from application of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. A
strong minority interest in the corporate structure may exist,
however, as where the minority shares are held by a potential
competitor of the parent, 174 and when such affiliated entities have
possibly conflicting economic goals, their combined conduct
would not be truly "unitary" in nature.
Despite the ambiguities with respect to the scope of the Copperweld decision, it is clear that the per se rule enunciated therein
will protect the conduct of parents and their wholly owned subsidiaries from section one liability. At least until the scope of the
Copperweld rule is further clarified, however, other relationships
between affiliated entities no doubt will be subjected to the methods of evaluation utilized prior to Copperweld. The Copperweld decision may lead courts to determine more frequently that the
intra-enterprise doctrine is inapplicable to certain forms of affiliation. Consequently, where it is clear that the partially owned entities and their parent corporation are acting as "one corporate
Id. at 2738-39.
Id. at 2741-42.
See id. at 2742-43 (analyzing common interests shared by entity and its unincorporated division as analogous to those shared by parent company and its wholly
owned subsidiary).
172 Determination of what would constitute the requisite majority interest for application of the Copperweld ruling is yet another element inviting resolution.
173 See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2742 (describing "one corporate consciousness"
theory).
174 See, e.g., Timken, 341 U.S. at 598 (American ball bearing manufacturer owning
30% interest in British ball bearing manufacturer and 50% interest in French ball
bearing manufacturer held to have conspired in violation of § 1). But cf. United
States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (airline
with 50% interest in air carrier held not to have conspired in violation of § 1), rev'd
on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
169
170
171
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consciousness" with a "unity of purpose and design," courts may
find the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine inapposite.
Joan M. Neri

